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THE BATTLE BETWEEN PLAIN MEANING AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: WHICH WILL DECIDE
THE STANDARD FOR PLEADING SCIENTER
AFTER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA)' has created much controversy in its attempt to re-
form the litigation system for securities fraud actions.2 After
a five year effort, Congress enacted the PSLRA over a presi-
dential veto,8 drawing praise from many business executives.4
Congress based its passage of the PSLRA on the presumption
that "It]he overriding purpose of our Nation's securities is to
protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities
markets, so that our national savings, capital formation and
investment may grow for the benefit of all Americans."5 Con-
gress recognized that private lawsuits for securities fraud
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets
and deter wrongdoing.' However, Congress felt the need to
implement procedural protections in order to discourage
frivolous lawsuits,7 and "to protect investors, issuers, and all
who are associated with our capital markets from abusive se-
curities litigation."8
The purpose of the PSLRA is to: (1) curb abusive prac-
tices in the conduct of securities class action suits; (2) put
greater control over class action suits in the hands of large
shareholders who are not "professional" plaintiffs; (3) require
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4
(West 1997).
2. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995).
3. See Bradford D. Duea, Forward, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 831, 832 (1996).
4. See id.
5. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 32.
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more detailed information about settlements to be disclosed
to shareholders; (4) deter plaintiffs from bringing frivolous
lawsuits by imposing sanctions in appropriate cases; (5) give
courts discretion to grant early dismissal of suits; (6) provide
a statutory safe harbor for forward looking statements; and
(7) provide a cap on damages by limiting joint and several li-
ability.9 As a result of the abuses, many "innocent parties
[weire often forced to pay exorbitant 'settlements."' 10 Even
defendants who were able to dismiss meritless suits often did
so only after expending much time and expense." Com-
pounding these injuries was the reluctance of many judges to
impose sanctions for frivolous suits. 2 Additionally, Congress
was concerned for the investing public and the entire U.S.
economy, which is injured by the unwillingness of qualified
individuals to serve on boards of directors and issuers from
discussing future prospects publicly for fear of baseless law-
suits. 3 To end these problems and abuses, the PSLRA made
many reforms, including the heightening of pleading re-
quirements for securities fraud actions, 4 which is the focus of
this comment.
Although the PSLRA intended to strengthen the plead-
ing standard, 5 much controversy has arisen as to its correct
interpretation. 6 Many courts interpret the PSLRA as merely
codifying the Second Circuit's standard, which held that
pleading recklessness or "motive and opportunity" is suffi-
cient for pleading scienter. 7 However, other courts interpret
9. See Martha L. Cochran, An Introduction to the Special Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act Issue, 10 No. 2 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (1996).
10. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
11. See John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification and
Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1103 (1996).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4
(West 1997). By heightening the pleading requirements for securities fraud ac-
tions, plaintiffs would need to meet the new standard in order to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss brought by a defendant.
15. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995).
16. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
17. See Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4227;
Hockey v. Medhekar, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4297 (N.D. Cal. 1998); In re Bur-
lington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Health
Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); OnBank &
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the PSLRA to be more stringent than the Second Circuit's
approach. 8 The PSLRA's text does not explicitly say whether
it codifies the Second Circuit's standard or whether it im-
poses a stricter standard. 9 This uncertainty as to the true
meaning of the legislation has led to various contradictory in-
terpretations of the scienter standard.2 °
This comment examines the various interpretations of
the PSLRA's pleading standard for scienter." It begins by
tracing a brief history of what standards preceded the
PSLRA," followed by the existing interpretations of the
PSLRA.2" The comment then analyzes the varying interpre-
tations based on the PSLRA's plain meaning24 and its legisla-
tive history.2' Finally, this comment determines that Con-
gress indeed intended a more stringent standard than that of
the Second Circuit.26 Much controversy exists as to whether
legislative history should be used in addition to plain mean-
ing when interpreting statutes generally. 7 Thus, in order to
reconcile the contradictory views regarding this debate, this
comment suggests that the courts adopt a more uniform ap-
proach that follows from both the PSLRA's plain meaning
and legislative history,28 in order to accomplish Congress'
true intent.29
Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 967 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Pi-
larczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Zeid v.
Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961
F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
18. See Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Nor-
wood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Fried-
berg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25,
1996).
19. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4
(West 1997).
20. See infra Part II.D.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.D.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See infra Part IV.B.
26. See infra Part IV.B.1.
27. See infra Part IV.B.3.
28. See infra Part IV.B.
29. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the PSLRA
Securities fraud actions are brought under Section 10(b)3"
and Rule 10b-51 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
The general standard for 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fraud actions
is "knowing or intentional misconduct." 2 Section 10(b) pro-
hibits the "use or employ[ment], in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security... [of] any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commis-
sion may prescribe."33 The elements of a Section 10(b) claim
are: "(1) a false statement or an omission that rendered an-
other statement misleading; (2) materiality; (3) scienter; (4)
loss causation; and (5) damages."34 Rule 10b-5 makes it ille-
gal "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading.., in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."35 Allegations of fraud
under Rule 10b-5 must satisfy the requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 6 to survive a motion to dismiss.37
Rule 9(b) requires that "the circumstances constituting fraud
be stated with particularity." This comment focuses on the
scienter requirement for actions under these rules.
The purpose of the PSLRA was to protect investors from
abusive securities litigation.39 Although Rule 9(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure requires a heightened pleading
standard for fraud actions by pleading allegations of fraud
with "particularity," it "has not prevented abuse of the secu-
30. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1994).
32. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 45 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
33. Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
34. Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 913 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (emphasis
added).
35. Voit, 977 F. Supp. at 367 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)).
36. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 9(b).
37. See Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
38. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 9(b).
39. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
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rities laws by private litigants."" Moreover, courts have in-
terpreted Rule 9(b)'s requirement in conflicting ways, leading
to different standards among the circuits when deciding a
motion to dismiss.4' Because of these differing standards, the
PSLRA was adopted to create more uniformity among
courts.42
The new pleading standard created by the PSLRA under
Subsection (b)(1) restates the rule under Rule 9(b),43 while
Subsection (b)(2) requires that the plaintiff "state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind."44 However,
the PSLRA does not expressly state what the required state
of mind is for scienter 4
Additionally, the PSLRA's legislative history has been
very controversial, and is where Congress has made specific
statements regarding its intent. For example, during Con-
gress' debate over the PSLRA, Senator Arlen Specter pro-
posed an amendment that would have codified the Second
Circuit's standard. 7 However, the Conference Committee's
Statement of Managers stated that Congress intended a
stricter rule than that of the Second Circuit. 8 Thus, the
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See Martha L. Cochran, Overview and Summary of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act, 923 PLI/CORP 9, 11 (1996).
43. See William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under
Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity,
Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 893, 900 (1996).
44. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4
(West 1997).
45. See id.
46. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 975 (1996).
47. See Olson, supra note 11, at 1117. Senator Specter proposed the fol-
lowing additional words:
For the purposes of paragraph (1), a strong inference that the defen-
dant acted with the required state of mind may be established either-
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud; or (B) by alleging facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reckless-
ness by the defendant.
141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
48. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 979. The Statement of Managers stated in
their report:
[r]egarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit
requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that
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amendment was deleted from the final Conference Commit-
tee Report.49 However, though Congress may have desired a
more stringent rule, it did not indicate how stringent it
should be."
When Senator Alfonse D'Amato submitted the Confer-
ence Committee Report to the Senate, he stated that the
PSLRA created a uniform standard and that this standard is
already incorporated in the law."' Thus, he presented it as
essentially codifying the Second Circuit's standard."2 Senator
Paul Sarbanes contended that the Conference Report made
the pleading standard more rigorous than what currently
existed. 3 Senator Christopher Dodd believed that the lan-
guage of the PSLRA endorsed the Second Circuit's standard,
but that it allowed individual courts to have discretion on a
case by case basis. 4 However, in his veto message, President
Clinton emphasized that he found that the PSLRA was unac-
ceptable because it called for a stricter standard than the
Second Circuit's approach." The President expressed concern
that the bill would "have the effect of closing the courthouse
door on investors who have legitimate claims. Those who are
the victims of fraud should have recourse in our courts. Un-
fortunately, changes made in this bill during conference could
well prevent that."6 These differing interpretations of the
PSLRA illustrate its inherent ambiguity.
To further complicate matters, new legislative history
was introduced on this subject with the passage of the Secu-
these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the defen-
dant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee intends
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to
codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading stan-
dard.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995).
49. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 979-80. A footnote to the Committee Re-
port explained the deletion of the Specter Amendment: "For this reason, the
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain lan-
guage relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-369, at 48 n.23 (1995).
50. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 980.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Olson, supra note 11, at 1119.
54. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 980. Thus, he appears to be saying that
courts could find allegations of motive and opportunity to be sufficient in some
cases, but not necessarily in all cases. Id.
55. See id. at 982.
56. Olson, supra note 11, at 1118.
582 [Vol. 39
1999] PLEADING SCIENTER AFTER PSLRA
rities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998."7 On May 4,
1998, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs stated,
[N]either the PSLRA nor S. 1260 in any way alters the sci-
enter standard in federal securities fraud suits. It was the
intent of Congress, as was expressly stated during the
legislative debate on the PSLRA, and particularly during
the debate on overriding the President's veto, that the
PSLRA establish a uniform federal standard on pleading
requirements by adopting the pleading standard applied
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals .... The Commit-
tee emphasizes that neither the PSLRA nor S.1260 makes
any attempt to define that state of mind.58
On October 9, 1998, the Statement of Managers stated
that "Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to
alter the standards of liability under the Exchange Act."
59
The statement made by President Clinton on November 3,
1998, indicated that he signed the new bill only because he
believed that it made the Second Circuit standard the uni-
form standard for pleading securities fraud.60 These new
statements, though not technically part of the PSLRA's leg-
islative history, will continue to cause debate about this issue
for sometime.
Much of the debate regarding the PSLRA is over the use
of this conflicting legislative history.61 Currently the Su-
preme Court has its own disagreements over the use of leg-
islative history, with Justice Breyer endorsing its use,62 and
Justice Scalia strongly criticizing it.63 In Shannon v. United
States,64 the Supreme Court declined to give weight to the
57. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. Law
105-353, S. 1260 (1998). The main purpose of this act was to make Federal
courts the exclusive venue for most securities class action lawsuits. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 105-803 (1998). It was enacted "to prevent plaintiffs from
seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive liti-
gation by filing suit in State, rather than in Federal court." See id.
58. S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998).
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803 (1998).
60. 1998 WL 13607107, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1998.
61. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 981.
62. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
63. See Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Jus-
tices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin
State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1996).
64. 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
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congressional endorsement of a procedure and instead
adopted a different procedure, stating "[w]e are not aware of
any case.., in which we have given authoritative weight to a
single passage of legislative history that is in no way an-
chored in the text of the statute."9 In Chevron USA Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,66 the Court created a
two-step method of statutory interpretation which ignored
legislative history.67 Moreover, the Court has shown its dis-
satisfaction with using legislative history in securities cases
by abdicating established methodology in favor of a "more
rigid textual approach."" Thus, there is much controversy as
to whether courts should follow the legislative history or fo-
cus merely on the PSLRA's statutory text.9 A court's accep-
tance or nonacceptance of the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation could be the deciding factor in the
outcome of this issue.
B. Definition of Scienter
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,7 ° the Supreme Court
ruled that in any private action for damages under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the defendant "must have intent to de-
ceive, manipulate, or defraud."7' The intent of Section 10(b)
was to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct,7" in-
volving some element of scienter. " The Court held that mere
65. Coffee, supra note 46, at 980 (quoting Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573, 583 (1994)).
66. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
67. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doc-
trine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 399 (1996). The first
step requires a court interpreting a statute to determine whether Congress has
"directly spoken" to the question at issue by expressing its intent unambigu-
ously. Id. If Congress has spoken, the court must follow what Congress has
directed. Id. If Congress has not spoken, the second step is for the court to de-
cide whether the agency administering the statute has adopted a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. Id.
68. Nathan F. Coco, Comment, Has Legislative History Become History?: A
Critical Examination of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 20 J. CORP. L. 555, 561 (1995). In Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), the Supreme
Court struck down aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b). Id.
69. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 980.
70. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
71. Id. at 193. Scienter is "a mental state embracing an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 194 n.12.
72. Id. at 197.
73. Id. at 201.
584 [Vol. 39
1999] PLEADING SCIENTER AFTER PSLRA
negligent wrongdoing is insufficient for the scienter require-
ment 4
The Supreme Court did not decide whether recklessness
is sufficient for scienter under 10(b) and 10b-5 claims; how-
ever, it recognized that recklessness is sometimes "considered
to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing
liability for some act."75  Because of this recognition, the
recklessness standard has long been accepted as sufficient for
pleading scienter in these actions.6
The present definition of recklessness in securities ac-
tions derives from Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Develop-
ment Authorit 7 7 where the court stated:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreason-
able omission, involving not merely simple, or even inex-
cusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.
78
This definition of recklessness, requiring more than mere
negligence, is "the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to
wilful fraud."79 Additionally, "[a]n egregious refusal to see
the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may in some cases
give rise to an inference of... recklessness.""° Therefore,
recklessness "involves conduct 'more culpable than mere
negligence,' but with an intent less culpable than
'deliberately and cold bloodedly... conceal[ing] informa-
tion."'8 '
74. Id. at 210.
75. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
76. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
77. 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
78. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.
1977) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719,
725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
79. Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting SEC v. Texas Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 868 (2d. Cir. 1968)). Willful fraud includes the reckless disregard of
the truth where individuals deliberately refrain from taking steps to discover
whether their statements were false. See In re Fischbach Corp. Sec. Litig.,
1992 WL 8715, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). Judge Friendly stated that one cannot "escape
liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily under-
stand." Id. (quoting SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968)).
80. Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1255 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(quoting Goldman v. McMahan, 706 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
81. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990).
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The PSLRA also has not stated whether recklessness
satisfies the scienter requirement, "except for the limited re-
quirement of actual knowledge for joint and several liability
and forward-looking statements."82 Thus, it is still not clear
if recklessness satisfies the pleading standard for scienter af-
ter the adoption of the PSLRA.
C. Standards for Pleading Scienter Before the PSLRA
1. The Second Circuit
The court in In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion" held that the facts alleged in a securities fraud com-
plaint must "give[] rise to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent
intent."84 In Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc.,85 the Second
Circuit ruled that a plaintiff may plead scienter by alleging
either: (1) "motive" and "opportunity" on the part of the de-
fendant(s) to commit fraud; or (2) "facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness."86 Pleading of motive would entail "concrete
benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false
statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged."87 Opportu-
nity entails "the means and likely prospect of achieving con-
crete benefits by the means alleged."8
Before the PSLRA, the standard set by the Second Cir-
cuit was the most stringent standard employed by any cir-
cuit.88 Under this standard, merely coupling factual state-
ments with conclusory allegations that the defendant was
reckless or had knowledge of falsity would not withstand a
motion to dismiss.90
82. William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 125-26 (1997).
83. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
84. Id. at 268 (quoting O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936
F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
85. 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994).
86. Id. at 1128 (citing In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir.
1993).
87. Id. at 1130.
88. Id.
89. See Olson, supra note 11, at 1108.
90. See id.
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2. The Ninth Circuit
In In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation,9 the Ninth
Circuit held that a plaintiff could plead scienter with conclu-
sory allegations so long as the complaint set forth the cir-
cumstances indicating the fraudulent nature of the state-
ments.92 The court refused to adopt the Second Circuit's view
that plaintiffs in securities fraud cases must plead facts giv-
ing rise to a "strong inference of fraudulent intent."93 In-
stead, the court recognized that Rule 9(b) does not require
"any particularity in connection with an averment of intent,
knowledge or condition of the mind."94 Therefore, plaintiffs
could aver scienter generally by alleging that scienter ex-
isted.9" However, Rule 9(b) imposed an obligation to aver
with "particularity the circumstances constituting fraud."99
"To allege fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must set forth
more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transac-
tion," including "what is false or misleading about a state-
ment, and why it is false."97 GlenFed allowed a plaintiff to
draw on contemporaneous statements or conditions to dem-
onstrate why statements were false when made,99 and
"allegations of specific problems undermining a defendant's
optimistic claims suffice to explain how the claims are
false."9
In Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,l°° the Ninth Circuit
observed that "[a]llegations of fraud based on information
and belief usually do not satisfy the degree of particularity
required under Rule 9(b)."1°' However, "an exception exists
where, as in cases of corporate fraud, the plaintiffs cannot be
expected to have personal knowledge of the facts constituting
91. 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
92. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1541, 1548-49.
93. Id. at 1545.
94. Id. at 1545 (emphasis omitted). The purposes of Rule 9(b) is "to provide
a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiffs claim, to safeguard a defendant's
reputation from 'improvident charges of wrongdoing,' and to protect a defen-
dant against the institution of a strike suit." Olson, supra note 11, at 1108.
95. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1548 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 1549.
99. Id.
100. Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987).
101. Lerach, supra note 43, at 905.
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the wrongdoing.""°2 Thus, an allegation based on information
and belief will be accepted if the misstatement is identified
by content, date, and the document in which it appeared,
along with the manner in which the representation was false
and misleading. °3
The Ninth Circuit standard was a much less stringent
pleading standard than that of the Second Circuit.' Con-
gress adopted the PSLRA in order to end this disparity be-
tween the circuits.0 5 Therefore, the PSLRA indicates that
the lenient standard of GlenFed no longer constitutes an
adequate pleading requirement for scienter in 10(b) and 10b-
5 cases.0 6 The current difficulty with the PSLRA lies with
the problem that on its face, many argue that it seems to
simply codify what the Second Circuit already requires. How-
ever, according to its legislative history, the PSLRA may im-
pose requirements that go well beyond those set by the Sec-
ond Circuit."' This new conflict has yet to be resolved.
D. Interpretations of the PSLRA Pleading Standard
1. Arguments in Favor of Adopting the Second Circuit
Test After the PSLRA
Many courts have held that the PSLRA merely adopts




105. See id. at 930.
106. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
107. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 978.
108. See Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4227;
Hockey v. Medhekar, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4297 (N.D. Cal. 1998); In re Bur-
lington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997); In re
Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 320 n.8 (N.D.N.Y.
1997); Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (referring to
statements that are not forward-looking); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F.
Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246,
1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 1297, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996). See also Epstein v. Itron, Inc., 993 F. Supp.
1314 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (expressing uncertainty whether Congress had adopted
the Second Circuit standard, the court nonetheless applied the Second Circuit
standard to find the complaint insufficient as to the first prong regarding mo-
tive and opportunity and sufficient as to the second prong regarding reckless-
ness).
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spite conflicting views regarding this issue, pleading motive
and opportunity or recklessness suffices to withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss, and the PSLRA does not impose a more rig-
orous pleading requirement than that enunciated by the Sec-
ond Circuit.109 Furthermore, these courts argue that the
intent of Congress must be deduced from the text of the stat-
ute itself."'
Courts adopting the Second Circuit standard first argue
that recklessness is sufficient for pleading scienter because it
has been commonly accepted in Section 10(b) cases."' In
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp.,"2
the district court argued that although the PSLRA elevates
the mental state required for certain specified situations to
"actual knowledge," situations that are not expressly speci-
fied, such as 10(b) and 10b-5 claims, do not have a more
stringent standard."3 Thus, the current standard of reck-
lessness suffices under the PSLRA.
These courts further argue that motive and opportunity
are also sufficient for pleading scienter despite the fact that
the PSLRA contains no references to this test."4 Moreover,
the courts contend that motive and opportunity are consis-
tent with the intent of Congress "that scienter be pled with
more than conclusory or generic allegations."" 5 Heightening
the standard to conform with the Second Circuit test, which
is the most stringent standard, "satisfies Congress' goal of
curtailing abusive securities litigation while still leaving
room for aggrieved parties to bring valid securities fraud
claims.""'
Furthermore, although Congress chose not to expressly
109. See Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
110. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
111. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
112. 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1996). In Marksman, plaintiffs
brought a securities fraud action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging
that defendants fraudulently reported high sales revenues on consignment
sales of their product. Id. at 1301. The court held that using the Second Cir-
cuit's approach, plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a strong inference of scienter.
Id. at 1315.
113. Id. at 1309 n.9.
114. See id. at 1310.
115. Id. at 1310. See also Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252
(N.D11. Rlh. 1997).
116. Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1252.
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codify the Second Circuit's test, these courts argue that Con-
gress did not intend to reject this standard."7 The Marksman
court argued that "Congress chose not to codify motive and
opportunity as pleading requirements but does not indicate
that Congress chose to specifically disapprove the motive and
opportunity test."118
Courts adopting the Second Circuit standard also argue
that the PSLRA's language mirrors the Second Circuit in its
application of Rule 9(b) to pleading scienter by requiring a
"strong inference" of the required state of mind."9 The dis-
trict court in Zeid v. Kimberly".. argued that the fact that
Congress modeled the PSLRA's standard after the Second
Circuit's "strong inference" language demonstrates some ap-
proval of the Second Circuit's case law.'2' Moreover, Zeid ar-
gued that the failure to provide an alternative interpretation
of the PSLRA "militates against completely dispensing with
the Second Circuit's test."
22
2. Arguments in Favor of Adopting a Standard Stricter
than That of the Second Circuit.
Though some courts insist that the PSLRA merely
adopts the Second Circuit standard for pleading scienter,"2'
many other courts disagree with this contention, arguing that
the PSLRA was not intended to codify the Second Circuit's
approach.1 24  These courts focus on the PSLRA's legislative
117. See OnBank & Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 967 F. Supp. 81,
88 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1252; Marksman Partners, L.P.
v. Chantal Pharm., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
118. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311.
119. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v.
Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman, 927 F.
Supp. at 1310.
120. 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Zeid ignored defendant's arguments
that the Second Circuit case law had been superseded, and instead evaluated
the complaint under the Second Circuit precedent. Lerach, supra note 43, at
897.
121. Zeid, 973 F. Supp. at 916.
122. Id. However, courts have significant leeway in interpreting the stan-
dard. Id.
123. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
124. See Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997); In
re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746
(N.D. Cal. 1997).
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history,'25 which arguably suggests that the PSLRA was in-
tended to surpass the Second Circuit's "motive and opportu-
nity" and "recklessness" standards.'26
These courts first argue that the Conference Committee
Report indicates its intent to strengthen the existing stan-
dard.'27 In its Conference Report, Congress stated that it
sought to "strengthen existing pleading requirements,"2 ' and
that "it [did] not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case
law interpreting this pleading standard."'29 Thus, these
courts place great emphasis on the explicit words of Con-
gress' intent shown in their report.
Additionally, these courts emphasize the fact that Con-
gress chose not to include in the new standard certain lan-
guage relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness.' The
district court in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion (Silicon Graphics I)"' noted that Congress declined to
pass a Senate bill which included an amendment that would
have codified the Second Circuit's standard and would have
allowed a plaintiff to use allegations of motive and opportu-
nity or recklessness to establish scienter."2 Thus, the Silicon
Graphics I court argued that the Conference Committee's
deletion of the Second Circuit standard from the final bill
"strongly militates against a judgment that Congress in-
125. Because the text of the PSLRA gives no guidance as to the proper inter-
pretation of the term "strong inference" of scienter, "the Court must look to the
legislative history of the Act for such guidance." Friedberg v. Discreet Logic
Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 48 (D. Mass. 1997).
126. See Voit, 977 F. Supp. at 374.
127. See Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
128. Norwood, 959 F. Supp. at 208 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369
(1995)).
129. Id.
130. See Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D. Mass.
1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
131. No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). In Silicon
Graphics I, plaintiffs alleged that defendants issued false and misleading in-
formation about the company in an effort to inflate the price of the company's
stock. Id. at *1. However, the court held that plaintiffs allegations were not
specific enough to raise a strong inference of fraud. Id. at *12. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has recently heard the oral argument regarding the Silicon Graphics case
and is expected to provide the first published federal appellate opinion on this
issue.
132. Id. at *5 (citing AMEND. 1485 S.240, 104th Cong. (1995)).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tended a result that it expressly declined to enact."'33
Finally, these courts also point to President Clinton's
veto of the PSLRA to show that Congress intended a more
stringent standard. 134  The President felt compelled to veto
the bill because Congress' intent to raise the existing stan-
dard was "crystal clear."'35 President Clinton stated that
Congress intended the PSLRA "to raise the [pleading] stan-
dard even beyond the [high pleading standard of the Second
Circuit.]"'36 The Silicon Graphics I court argued that in fur-
ther emphasizing its "crystal clear" intent to heighten the
pleading standard, Congress overrode the veto and passed
the bill.'37
Because it did not accept the Second Circuit standard as
satisfying the pleading requirement of the PSLRA, Silicon
Graphics I instead requires plaintiffs to allege circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior by the defendants.'38 Although
Congress chose not to codify the Second Circuit's law relating
to motive, opportunity, and recklessness, scienter could be
sufficiently pled by alleging the defendant's conscious misbe-
havior.'39
In establishing circumstantial evidence of conscious be-
havior or actual knowledge, the plaintiff must do more than
speculate as to the defendant's motives or make conclusory
allegations of scienter."'  Instead, the plaintiff must allege
specific facts of misconduct.' Therefore, a plaintiff cannot
couple a factual statement with a conclusory allegation of
fraudulent intent in order to adequately plead scienter."2
133. Id. at *6.
134. See Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208(S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
135. See Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 104-
150, at 240 (1995)).
136. Norwood, 959 F. Supp. at 208.
137. Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
138. See Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa.); Powers
v. Eichen, 1997 WL 587034, at *6 (S.D. Cal.); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc.,
959 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D.Mass. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc.,
959 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
139. See Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 49.
140. See Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *12.
141. See id.
142. See Norwood, 959 F. Supp. at 208.
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The district court, in Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc.,143 ar-
gued that in light of the fact that the PSLRA eliminated
recklessness, conscious behavior can now only take the form
of circumstantial evidence indicating an intent to defraud or
knowledge of falsity. 4 4  Thus, the "conscious behavior" ap-
proach is more stringent than the "reckless behavior" plead-
ing approach to scienter. 45
In Silicon Graphics //,146 the role of recklessness was re-
evaluated by the court. The district court held that to ade-
quately plead fraud, a plaintiff "must create a strong infer-
ence of knowing or intentional misconduct." 147  This
"knowing or intentional misconduct includes deliberate
recklessness, as described in Hollinger and alluded to in
Hochfelder."148 However, the court limited the role of reck-
lessness by stating that "[m]otive, opportunity, and nondelib-
erate recklessness may provide some evidence of intentional
wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient to support scienter
unless the totality of the evidence creates a strong inference
of fraud."1 49
3. Arguments in Favor of Allowing Recklessness, but not
Motive and Opportunity for Pleading Scienter.
Some courts are now adopting the opinion that Congress
intended to keep the recklessness prong of the Second Cir-
cuit's standard, but that the PSLRA requires more than the
pleading of motive and opportunity.5 °  Courts such as
143. 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997). In Friedberg, the plaintiff alleged
three specific facts that constituted circumstantial evidence of conscious misbe-
havior by the defendants. Id. at 50. The court held that these facts constituted
a "strong inference" of scienter and thus, rejected the motion to dismiss. Id.
144. Id. at 49 n.2.
145. Id.
146. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997). After the district court in Silicon
Graphics I dismissed plaintiffs suit with leave to amend, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint which resulted in the Silicon Graphics If decision. This
decision is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and will be the first appel-
late decision on this issue.
147. In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, No. Civ.A.l: 97-CV-
3183, 1998 WL 8041929, at *13 (N. Ga.); Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., No.
Civ.A. 1: 97-CV3706-TWT, 1998 WL 804925 (N.D. Ga.); Malin v. Ivax Corp.,
No. 96-1843-Civ., 1998 WL 519595,. at *9-10 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Queen Uno Ltd.
Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines, 2 F.Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998);
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Marksman, argue that recklessness has long been accepted
as sufficient for pleading scienter."' Recklessness in this
context approximates actual intent and is not a mere height-
ened form of negligence.'52 The district court in In re Baesa
Securities Litigation 5. recognized that "recklessness," in its
classic formulation, describes a conscious state of mind that
is inherently deceptive.' Thus, "recklessness" means "a con-
scious and purposeful disregard of the truth about a known
risk." ' Even an allegation of gross negligence would be in-
sufficient in a securities fraud action."6 Baesa stated that
"[w]hile the Supreme Court remains free to overrule this de-
termination, nothing in the Reform Act purports to do so."""
Thus, Baesa holds that pleading recklessness is sufficient
under the PSLRA."5
Though recklessness may be sufficient for pleading scien-
ter, these courts argue that pleading motive and opportunity
is not sufficient under the PSLRA."9 Baesa emphasized that
while the statute adopts the "strong inference" requirement,
it does not mention "motive and opportunity." 0 Thus, the
court concluded that from the plain language of the PSLRA,
the mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not, of it-
self, automatically suffice to raise a strong inference of scien-
ter. 1
6
However, despite the fact that these courts do not accept
In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F.Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (D. Nev. 1998);
Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 Civ. 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997)); In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Glenayre Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
151. See Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241.
152. See Glenayre, 982 F. Supp. at 297.
153. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Baesa, plaintiffs alleged that de-
fendants issued false and misleading public statements that materially over-
stated the company's earnings and concealed the company's true deteriorating
financial position. Id. at 240. The court, however, ruled that mere knowledge
of mismanagement does not create a strong inference that the financial state-
ments are false, and thus, the case was dismissed. Id. at 243.
154. Id. at 241.
155. Mark Stein, Private Securities Reform Act: Court Offers Guidance on
Pleading Requirements, 12 No.3 CORP. COUNS. 1 (1997).
156. See id. at 2.
157. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
158. Id. at 239.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 242.
161. Id.
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motive and opportunity as sufficient pleading standards, they
recognize that pleading motive and opportunity may still be
relevant when pleading circumstances from which a strong
inference of fraudulent intent may be inferred. 62 Under the
PSLRA, and in contrast to the Second Circuit, such circum-
stances are not presumed sufficient to do so.'63 Therefore,
even if motive and opportunity are adequately pled, facts
giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent must
still be alleged.'64
The Baesa reasoning has been adopted by many courts,
including that of the district court in Carley Capital Group v.
Deloitte & Touche."' In Carley, the court stated that the
Baesa approach is consistent with the original Conference
Committee Report to the PSLRA and the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference Regarding S.
1260. 166 The court held that even with the new legislative
history attached to the Uniform Standards Act of 1998, "the
Second Circuit's two pronged standard of (1) motive and op-
portunity or (2) conscious misbehavior or recklessness relate
to the definition of state of mind and are not incorporated in
or repealed by the Reform Act."'67
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Prevention of frivolous and abusive litigation is ex-
tremely important and is currently a matter of great con-
cern. "'68 One area that has felt its share of abuse is securities
fraud litigation.'69 To combat this abuse, the PSLRA made
great efforts to enact reforms that would discourage plaintiffs
from filing poorly pled or weak cases, and hasten their early
dismissal under a motion to dismiss.
170
162. See id.
163. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
164. See Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 Civ. 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997).
165. 1998 WL 804929 (N.D. Ga.).
166. See id. at *13.
167. Id. at *14. See also In re Glenayre Tech., Sec. Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20344 at *3 n.3 (stating that motive and opportunity is not sufficient to
establish scienter after the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998).
168. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
169. See id.
170. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection
Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U.L. REV. 69,
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In the past, federal securities complaints have been diffi-
cult to dismiss. 7' Rule 9(b), which governed the pleading
standard for 10(b) and 10b-5 claims before the passage of the
PSLRA, created much confusion over the proper standard
when pleading these claims.'72 Although the courts agreed
that Rule 9(b) required a complaint to allege with particular-
ity which statements were false, courts have differed as to
the required degree of particularity for allegations of the de-
fendant's state of mind.
7 3
To clarify these inconsistencies Congress passed the
PSLRA."' Since its adoption, opponents have attacked the
PSLRA for having many ambiguous gaps, 75 which make it
difficult for courts to follow.' The source of much of this at-
tack has been the ambiguity regarding the heightening of the
pleading standard for scienter.77
The issue analyzed by this comment is whether the
PSLRA merely codifies the standard already set by the Sec-
ond Circuit,'78 or whether a stricter standard for pleading sci-
enter should be imposed.'79 The PSLRA neglects to define
precisely what the required state of mind is for pleading sci-
enter.8 ° As a result of this omission, courts have continued to
apply different standards,' basing their reasons either on a
plain reading of the PSLRA or on its lengthy legislative his-
tory.'82 This has led to great confusion and speculation, and
will be further complicated by the new legislative history as-
sociated with the Uniform Standards Act of 1998. The an-
swer to these problems may lie in the resolution of the ques-
70 (1997).
171. See Olson, supra note 11, at 1107.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Lerach, supra note 43, at 894-95.
175. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 975.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See supra Part II.D.1.
179. See supra Part II.D.2.
180. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4
(West 1997).
181. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
182. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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tion of whether courts should focus only on the plain text of a
statute, or whether they should also examine the legislative
history when determining the precise intent of a statute.
Much unresolved debate has existed over this issue for some
time.
Therefore, the issues in need of resolution are (1)
whether the legislative history of the PSLRA indeed shows
Congress' intent to create a stricter standard than that of the
Second Circuit, and if so, (2) can this legislative history be
relied upon by the courts when determining whether scienter
has been adequately pled?
IV. ANALYSIS
Despite the arguments that a plain meaning analysis
clearly supports the Second Circuit standard for pleading sci-
enter,8 ' the plain meaning of the PSLRA only has strong
support for including the "recklessness" prong of the Second
Circuit standard, with much less support for the "motive and
opportunity" prong."' The legislative history of the PSLRA
may have some role in its interpretation because it is rele-
vant in showing Congress' intent for the standard.'
A. Plain Meaning of the PSLRA
The PSLRA provides that plaintiffs must "state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind."'86 However,
there is much ambiguity in this statement because the
PSLRA neglects to express what state of mind is required.8 7
Many courts argue that this language mirrors the Second
Circuit's language,'88 and therefore, the Second Circuit's two
prong test suffices as the required state of mind.'89 Though
183. See Rehm v. Eagle. Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
184. See infra Part IVA.
185. See infra Part IV.B.1.
186. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4
(West 1997).
187. Id.
188. See supra Part II.D.1.
189. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v.
Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners,
L.P. v. Chantel Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The
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the Second Circuit uses "strong inference" language, 9 ' the
PSLRA includes no other language of the Second Circuit.
Thus, even a plain meaning argument used by the courts in
support of the Second Circuit standard' is tenuous at best.
The Zeid court argued that the fact that Congress mod-
eled the standard after the Second Circuit's test by making
use of the "strong inference" language demonstrates some
approval of the Second Circuit's approach. 192 By using this
language, Congress did not intend to increase the required
state of mind or to cast doubt on the validity of the existing
Second Circuit standard which allowed plaintiffs to raise a
strong inference of scienter.' 9' However, this language does
not refer to the two prongs of the Second Circuit standard,'94
making it very unclear whether Congress intended to adopt
this standard. Courts that support the Second Circuit stan-
dard by using a plain meaning analysis of the PSLRA con-
tend that Congress' use of similar language is compelling
evidence that Congress intended this standard to suffice.'99
However, the mere use of this one phrase, without more, is
not convincing evidence that Congress intended to adopt the
existing standard, which contains more than just the "strong
inference" language."'
Although most courts agree that some of the language
may indeed be modeled upon the Second Circuit's approach,
there is much debate over Congress' silence regarding the
Second Circuit standard.'97 Some courts argue that silence
regarding the Second Circuit standard does not mean that
Committee stated that "[t]he Conference Committee language is based in part
on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369,
at 48 (1995).
190. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
191. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantel Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
192. Zeid, 973 F. Supp. at 917. In addition, the court emphasizes that there
is no alternative interpretation which would allow the court to completely dis-
pense with the Second Circuit's two part inquiry. Id.
193. See Lerach, supra note 43, at 956-57.
194. See Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
195. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
196. See Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
197. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal
Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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the test is invalid. 198 However, other courts disagree and con-
tend that silence shows Congress' intent not to codify the
Second Circuit's standard.19 9 The latter argument has more
credibility due to the fact that Congress had the opportunity
to clarify any ambiguities as a result of this silence, but in-
stead chose not to explicitly use the Second Circuit's lan-
guage about "recklessness" and "motive and opportunity."
2 °
In Marksman, the court reasoned that the fact that Con-
gress chose not to codify the Second Circuit's standard does
not indicate that Congress chose specifically to invalidate the
standard. 20 ' Thus, just because Congress did not make mo-
tive and opportunity or recklessness an express part of the
pleading standard does not mean that they disapproved of
this approach.0 2 The Zeid court also recognized this argu-
ment, but emphasized that because Congress chose not to
codify the case law, courts have significant leeway when in-
terpreting the "strong inference" standard.2 2 While the Sec-
ond Circuit case law provides guidance for interpreting the
standard, courts can modify or reject any case law that "is in-
consistent with the letter or spirit of the [PSLRA]."2°'
However, other courts that use a stricter standard have
good reason to disagree with this idea that silence does not
necessarily mean disapproval of the Second Circuit stan-
dard.2 ' Senator Arlen Specter proposed an amendment that
would have codified the standard; however, Congress chose
198. See OnBank & Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 967 F. Supp. 81, 88
n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman
Partners, L.P. v. Chantel Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
199. See Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997); In
re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393 1996 WL 664639, at *5 n.23 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996).
200. See supra text p. 105.
201. Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1311.
202. See OnBank & Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 967 F. Supp. 81,
88 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
203. Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
204. Id.
205. See Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997); In
re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996).
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not to adopt this amendment."°6 The Silicon Graphics I court
argued that Congress' deletion of this amendment could not
show that the legislators had an intention for a result that
they expressly declined to codify. °7  Furthermore, these
courts argue that Congress' silence regarding the standard
shows that motive, opportunity, and recklessness were not
sufficiently stringent for pleading scienter. °8 This is a valid
argument because it would have been easy for Congress to
include the Second Circuit test had it really intended to adopt
it."°9 Congress proposed the amendment because many of its
members knew the PSLRA was unclear, 10 and therefore, any
ambiguity could have been clarified by its adoption.
Although Congress may not have wanted to codify the
entire Second Circuit standard, credible arguments support
the contention that Congress intended to accept at least the
recklessness prong of the test.21' Though Baesa1 2 accepted
recklessness as sufficient for pleading scienter under the
PSLRA,"1' it recognized Congress' silence as to motive and
opportunity as an intention to discard this standard." '
Therefore, the Baesa court concluded "from the plain lan-
guage of the statute that the mere pleading of motive and op-
portunity does not, of itself, automatically suffice to raise a
strong inference of scienter."215 This is a persuasive argu-
ment because "recklessness" has a long history of being suffi-
cient for pleading scienter,"6 and therefore, it was probably
assumed as sufficient in the PSLRA. However, "motive and
206. See Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5 n.23 (citing AMEND 1485 S.
240, 104th Cong (1995)).
207. Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *6.
208. See Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D. Mass.
1997).
209. Congress could have simply adopted the Specter amendment. See supra
text p. 105.
210. See 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Specter).
211. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 239.
214. Id. at 242.
215. Id.
216. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir.
1990); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir.
1977). See also 63 SEC Docket 2066 (1997) (announcing the SEC's position
against the ruling in Silicon Graphics and stating that Congress did not intend
to eliminate recklessness from the standard for pleading scienter).
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opportunity" has not been widely recognized outside of the
Second Circuit, thus, Congress may not have assumed this
prong in the drafting of the PSLRA.217
To support the argument that "recklessness" should suf-
fice under the PSLRA, many courts have reasoned that the
text's plain language can be read to include commonly ac-
cepted definitions of scienter, which have long included
recklessness."' The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder1 9 defined scienter as "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."2 The Court also
recognized that recklessness is often considered a form of in-
tentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for cer-
tain acts.22 ' Courts after Ernst used that recognition in order
to allow recklessness to suffice for pleading scienter in Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. 2 However, because Ernst
held that mere negligence would not suffice for scienter,2
recklessness requires more than just a heightened degree of
negligence224 in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Fur-
thermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission has con-
sistently supported a recklessness standard in Section 10(b)
cases. 225
Baesa used this common understanding of recklessness
in its argument that the recklessness prong of the Second
Circuit test is sufficient under the PSLRA. 2 '6 The court em-
phasized that "virtually every [c]ircuit [c]ourt to consider the
217. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
218. See id. at 239.
219. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
220. Id. at 194 n.12.
221. Id.
222. This kind of recklessness is equivalent to wilful fraud. See Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1977).
223. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210.
224. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir.
1990); Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045.
225. The Securities and Exchange Commission supports the recklessness
standard because it "discourages deliberate ignorance and also prevents defen-
dants from escaping liability simply because of the difficulty of proving knowl-
edge or conscious intent on the basis of the circumstantial evidence frequently
used in securities fraud cases." 63 S.E.C. Docket 2066 (1997). The SEC further
noted that retreating from this "standard would greatly erode the deterrent ef-
fect of Section 10(b) actions." Id. In its friend of the court brief submitted in
the Silicon Graphics case, the Commission noted that every court of appeals
has held that recklessness is sufficient to establish liability in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 actions. Id.
226. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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issue, including the Second Circuit, held that recklessness
suffices." 27 Furthermore, other courts have argued that
recklessness is part of the current standard since it was ex-
pressly limited in other parts of the PSLRA, but not in the
part concerning pleading.22 Under the PSLRA, recklessness
is not sufficient to impose liability for "forward-looking
statements., 229 However, nowhere in the PSLRA does it limit
recklessness for non forward-looking statements.2 ' Thus,
"[w]hen Congress intended, with the Act, to limit liability for
reckless conduct, it did say so."22' Because liability for reck-
lessness has long been recognized as an inherent aspect of
fraud, this allows a strong basis to conclude that scienter is
satisfied by showing recklessness under the PSLRA. 2
Due to this common understanding about recklessness, a
plain meaning analysis indicates that recklessness would be
sufficient for pleading scienter under the PSLRA.2 2 How-
ever, contrary to the many cases supporting the Second Cir-
cuit standard, 4 there is much less support for allowing
"motive and opportunity" as being sufficient.
B. Legislative History of the PSLRA
The PSLRA has a lengthy legislative history and the use
of this history in interpreting the PSLRA's language is quite
controversial. 235 Though some courts have decided to put lit-
tle weight on this history,2 6 many other courts recognize its
227. Id. at 241 (citing inter alia Rolfv. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d
38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
228. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1297, 1309 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
229. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
230. See id.
231. Lerach, supra note 43, at 915 (emphasis omitted).
232. See Kuehnle, supra note 82, at 127.
233. It is important to note that the cases which accept recklessness agree
that "simple recklessness" will not suffice. Instead, the level of recklessness
must be so extreme that some kind of conscious intent can be inferred. See
Richard M. Phillips et al., Impact of the Reform Act on Federal Securities Class
Actions, SC88 ALI-ABA 351, 377 (1998).
234. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
235. See Olson, supra note 11, at 1116-22.
236. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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importance and rely heavily on it when interpreting the
PSLRA. 37
1. Congress Chose not to Codify the Second Circuit
Standard
The first argument courts use when stating that the
PSLRA does not codify the Second Circuit standard for
pleading scienter is that Congress expressly chose not to cod-
ify the standard even though it had an opportunity to do so in
its initial drafting of the PSLRA. 238 The Silicon Graphics I
court 239 emphasized that the Conference Committee Report
indicates that Congress intended to strengthen the existing
standard. 2" This language is very compelling. The Supreme
Court has expressed that "the authoritative source for finding
the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports or the
bill, which represen[t] the considered and collective under-
standing of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation."241 The Conference Committee
noted that the Second Circuit standard was regarded as the
most stringent pleading standard,242 but "[b]ecause the Con-
ference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard., 243  From this
language, it is clear that it was the express intent of the
Committee to strengthen the pleading standard beyond that
of the Second Circuit.24 Therefore, through the use of this
piece of legislative history, the PSLRA is not a mere codifica-
tion of the law already in place by the Second Circuit.4
Despite this explicit language regarding Congress' in-
tent, ' some courts have chosen to continue applying the Sec-
ond Circuit standard and ignore this persuasive legislative
237. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
238. See id. at *5.
239. No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
240. Id. at *5 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995)).
241. Id. at *6.
242. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
243. Id. at 41.
244. Id.
245. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639,
*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
246. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
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history.24 ' In Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp.,248 the district
court noted that the fact that Congress chose not to codify the
Second Circuit standard does not mean that it specifically
chose to disapprove of the test. '49 However, this reasoning is
considerably flawed since the Conference Committee explic-
itly stated that it intended to strengthen the existing stan-
dard.25° These words are very persuasive in showing that
Congress intended a standard somewhat more stringent than
that of the Second Circuit.' When weighing Congress' si-
lence regarding the two prongs of the Second Circuit stan-
dard252 with the rejection of an amendment that would have
clarified the issue, 52 the answer points in favor of Congress'
intent to have a standard more stringent than what had al-
ready existed.
Even without the use of this legislative history, Baesa..4
correctly reconciles the problem of Congress' ambiguity in not
codifying the standard, and its statement that it intended to
strengthen the standard.255 Baesa argues against using leg-
islative history to interpret the statute,5 and bases its hold-
ing on the plain meaning of the statute.2 7 The court noted
that the Congressional byplay "that accompanies the enact-
ment of a controversial law like the Reform Act inevitably
yields a rich cornucopia of legislative history on which courts
of every appetite can feed. But when it comes to interpreting
such byplay, courts are poorly equipped to separate the husks
from the kernels."258 However, Baesa interprets the plain
language of the statute to require more than the pleading of
motive and opportunity.5 9 Thus, the court reconciles the use
of plain meaning of the statute and Congress' intent to enact
247. See OnBank & Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 967 F. Supp. 81
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Rehm v.
Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P.
v. Chantel Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
248. Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1246.
249. Id. at 1252 (citing Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311).
250. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
251. See id.
252. See supra text pp. 119-20.
253. See supra text p. 105.
254. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
255. Id. at 242.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 242 n.2.
259. Id. at 242.
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a more stringent standard than that of the Second Circuit.161
This interpretation adequately recognizes the express intent
of Congress to create a stricter standard, as well as Congress'
possible intent to keep the recklessness prong, which has
long been held sufficient for pleading scienter.26'
Another important piece of legislative history, which
many courts consider, is the presidential veto of the
PSLRA. 262 This is an indication that Congress intended a
more stringent standard than that of the Second Circuit. The
President was compelled to veto the bill because he believed
it was "crystal clear" that Congress intended to raise the
standard beyond what already existed under the Second Cir-
cuit.263 The President informed Congress that he would be
willing to support the high pleading standard of the Second
Circuit, but would not support anything beyond the level of
that standard.264 He believed the PSLRA would erect a bar-
rier "so high that even the most aggrieved investors with the
most painful losses may get tossed out of court before they
have a chance to prove their case."265 The court in Silicon
Graphics f 66 argued that "[flurther emphasizing its 'crystal
clear' intent to heighten the pleading standard, Congress
overrode the veto."26' Despite this language by the President,
those supporting the Second Circuit standard argue that "the
President's characterization of the Reform Act cannot deter-
mine what Congress itself intended." 8' However, the better
rationale is that if the President read the PSLRA as sup-
porting a stricter standard, and Congress did not make any
260. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
261. See supra note 218, and accompanying text. This rationale is supported
even with the new statements made in the legislative history attached to the
Securities Lititgation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. See Carley Capital
Group v. Deloitte & Touche, 1998 WL 804929, at *13-14 (N.D. Ga.); Sturm v.
Marriott Marquis Corp., 1998 WL 804925, at *10 (N.D. Ga.).
262. H.R. Doc. No. 104-150, at 240 (1995).
263. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (citing H.R. DOC. No. 104-150, at 240
(1995)).
264. See Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5 (citing H.R. DOC. No. 104-
150, at 240 (1995)).
265. Elliot J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed
Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 675, 675 (1996) (quoting H.R. DOC. No.
104-150, at 240 (1995)).
266. No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
267. Id. at *5.
268. Coffee, supra note 46, at 982.
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changes to the PSLRA to clarify their intent, it is indeed most
likely that the President's interpretation was correct and
Congress agreed with his initial reading of the PSLRA.265
Although Congress never explicitly wrote into the bill its
intent to have a more stringent standard than the one al-
ready existing in the Second Circuit, it is quite clear from the
language in the Conference Committee Report that Congress
indeed intended a more stringent standard.27 °
2. Congress Did Not Intend to Alter the Standard of
Liability
With the passage of the Uniform Standards Act of
1998, new legislative history was included regarding the sci-
enter standard. 27' This new "history" appears to suggest that
Congress wanted to adopt the Second Circuit standard as the
uniform approach.272 However, this raises a number of new
questions. First, this is legislative history created more than
two and a half years after the passage of the PSLRA. Con-
gress again was given the ability to make their intentions
clear in actual legislation, but it chose not to. 27 Thus, if Con-
gress indeed wanted to make the Second Circuit standard the
uniform approach, it should have put this in actual legisla-
tion. Furthermore, though many encourage the use of legis-
lative history to interpret ambiguous statutes,211 it is much
more questionable to use legislative history created years af-
ter the passage of the original statute by a different Con-
275gress.
269. See Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 66469, at *5 (citing H.R. DOC. No. 104-
150, at 240 (1995)).
270. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995). See also Michael A Dorelli, Note,
Striking Back at "Extortionate" Securities Litigation: Silicon Graphics Leads
the Way to a Truly Heightened and Uniform Pleading Standard, 31 IND. L.
REV. 1189, 1217 (1998) (stating that the Silicon Graphics standard is sensitive
to the goal of Congress to create reform and creates a balance between "the
need to prevent redress, deceptive, and manipulative practice in securities liti-
gation and the maintenance of respectable capital markets.").
271. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
272. See S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998).
273. See S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998) (statement of Senators Sarbanes, Bryan,
and Johnson) (noting a shortcoming of the new Bill was its failure to codify li-
ability for reckless conduct).
274. See infra Part IV.B.3.
275. See S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998) (statement of Senators Sarbanes, Bryan,
and Johnson). In their statement, Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Johnson
stated:
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Also, when looking closely at this new "history," it fo-
cuses only on Congress' intent to preserve the "recklessness"
standard.2 6  Conspicuously missing in both the Senate and
House reports is any explicit desire to keep the "motive and
opportunity" prong of the Second Circuit standard. Since the
trend among most cases is to keep "recklessness," these new
statements seem to make little difference. Additionally, in
Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche,27 the district
court addressed this new language and held that it did not
codify the Second Circuit standard in any way.2 78 The court
held that though recklessness is sufficient, "the 'motive and
opportunity' standard, if honestly applied, lowers the bar for
securities fraud cases below that mandated by the Supreme
Court in Hochfelder."27 '  Although these different pieces of
legislative history were written to help define the standard
intended by Congress, their contradictions are problematic
for those who argue that legislative history should be used to
interpret the PSLRA.28°
3. Arguments for and Against Using Legislative History
Much controversy currently exists over whether legisla-
tive history should be used at all when interpreting a stat-
ute." ' Some argue that legislative history is an important
part of statutory interpretation and cannot be dispensed
[Legislative history] is not a substitute for legislative language. Fed-
eral courts do not uniformly consider legislative history when deciding
questions of statutory interpretation. Even those courts that do may
not consider legislative history prepared in a succeeding Congress
when interpreting a statute enacted in a preceding Congress .... The
Bill therefore would preempt State class actions in favor of a uniform
Federal standard potentially containing a disastrous flaw, namely no
imposition of liability for reckless conduct.
Id. See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases v. Connecticut Gen. Ins.
Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) (stating that "post-passage remarks of legisla-
tors, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress
expressed before the Act's passage").
276. See S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998).
277. 1998 WL 804929 (N.D. Ga.).
278. Id. at *14. The court instead followed Eleventh Circuit precedent which
has never adopted a scienter standard that allows for the pleading of "motive
and opportunity." Id.
279. Id. at *14; Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 1998 WL 804925 (N.D.
Ga.).
280. See Breyer, supra note 62; Dortzbach, supra note 63.
281. See Dortzbach, supra note 63, at 162.
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with.282 Justice Breyer has argued that under the following
five circumstances, a court should turn to legislative history
for help in interpreting a statute: (1) avoiding an absurd re-
sult;283 (2) preventing the law from turning on an error in
drafting;84 (3) understanding the meaning of specialized
terms;88 (4) understanding the "reasonable purpose" a provi-
sion might serve;288 and (5) choosing among several possible
"reasonable purposes" for language in a politically controver-
sial law. 7 Use of legislative history to interpret the PSLRA
could fall under a number of these reasons, including the last
regarding a controversial law. Justice Breyer further argues
that although use of legislative history has some pitfalls, it is
significantly better than the alternative of relying on canons
of interpretation.288 Though there are persuasive arguments
on both sides of this issue, use of legislative history to inter-
pret the PSLRA is very compelling due to its length and the
controversy surrounding its meaning regarding the scienter
issue.
Some scholars have argued that without looking at leg-
islative history, many securities law doctrines will be imper-
iled.289 In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A.,29 the Supreme Court's treatment of
legislative history was a departure from past methodology.2"'
The Court ignored the legislative history of the securities law
at issue and came to a very controversial conclusion by
striking down aiding and abetting liability under Section
10(b). " The Court stated that strict adherence to statutory
language is "[t]he starting point in every case involving con-
struction of a statute." 3 The Court then based its decision
almost exclusively upon the plain language of Section 10(b). 94
282. See Breyer, supra note 62, at 845.





288. Dortzbach, supra note 63, at 171.
289. See Coco, supra note 68, at 557.
290. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
291. See Coco, supra note 68, at 562.
292. See id. at 561.
293. Id. at 564 (quoting Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 172).
294. See id. at 564.
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Because use of legislative history may have led to a different
ruling, it is evident from Central Bank that discarding legis-
lative history can significantly impact the outcome of a stat-
ute's interpretation. The interpretation of the pleading stan-
dard under the PSLRA could also possibly have a different
outcome if the Court dispenses with the use of its legislative
history.29
Another argument in favor of legislative history is that
scholars emphasize the reliability of Conference Committee
Reports in their arguments for the use of legislative his-
tory."' Historically, committee reports constitute nearly fifty
percent of the Supreme Court's references to legislative his-
tory materials.297 Ordinarily, these reports are considered the
most reliable and persuasive element of legislative history. 9 '
As Justice Harlan noted, they represent the "considered and
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
drafting and studying proposed legislation."99 Thus, under
this view, the Conference Committee Report on the PSLRA
would have much weight in showing Congress' true intent for
the pleading standard for scienter. This argument is quite
persuasive considering Congress' explicit words revealing its
intent for a more stringent pleading standard."°° Though the
Committee Reports associated with the Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 adds somewhat conflicting information, 1 it was
included years later and has much less weight than the
original report which shows the intent at the actual time of
the passage of the PSLRA.
Others argue that legislative history should not be con-
sidered when interpreting a statute; instead, courts must
look to the statute itself to determine its intent. 0 2 Among the
295. The courts in Marksman and Silicon Graphics I reached very different
conclusions about the pleading standard because of their different views re-
garding the use of legislative history. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); Marksman
Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
296. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fic-
tions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other
Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39 (1990).
297. See id. at 43.
298. See id.
299. Id. (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
300. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
301. See supra notes 57-60.
302. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative His-
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arguments waged against using legislative history are that it
is unconstitutional, it necessarily relies upon a fiction of leg-
islative intent, and it is easily manipulated by legislators.3 03
Critics claim that legislative history lacks legitimacy because
a legislature never voted on it, nor did an executive member
sign it into law."°4 They also claim that in many cases, no
collective intent existed in forming the meaning assumed to
be evidenced within the committee reports,0 5 and legislative
history is subject to many possible interpretations.3 6 Critics
worry that judges will use legislative history to improperly
arrive at incorrect results and to improperly usurp power
from the legislative and executive branches.0 7
Justice Scalia and other critics0 8 suggest that less reli-
ance should be placed on legislative history and that the rela-
tive importance of committee reports and floor debates
should be reversed. 9  Scalia uses a textualist approach that
focuses on what the text of a statute actually says and not on
what its sponsors intended it to mean. 10 Scalia argues that
legislative history lacks legitimacy since it is not the law it-
self.31 ' He contends that judges could create an intent for the
legislature where none truly existed, and therefore, use of
legislative history is dangerous. 2 Scalia stated that "[t]he
law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves
with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who en-
acted it."3 13 Therefore, Scalia contends that the plain mean-
ing of the text is the most reliable evidence of Congress' in-
tent. 314
tory, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 378 (1987).
303. See Coco, supra note 68, at 563.
304. See Dortzbach, supra note 63, at 162.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 193.
308. See Costello, supra note 296, at 41.
309. See id. at 39.
310. See Dortzbach, supra note 63, at 179.
311. See id. at 182. Justice Scalia borrowed the metaphor of Judge Harold
Levanthal to describe the use of legislative history as "[t]he equivalent of en-
tering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of guests for one's
friends." Id. (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
312. See id. at 185.
313. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,
285 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
314. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurispru-
dence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 418
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Recently, the Supreme Court has engaged in a pattern of
statutory interpretation that suggests it believes it should
not use legislative history as extensively as it has in the
past.315 In Shannon v. United States,316 the Court stated that
"courts have no authority to enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned
solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference
point."317 Currently, the Supreme Court will pay little atten-
tion to statements in the legislative history that are not
"anchored" to some provision in the statutory text.318 This
trend could prevent the use of legislative history for inter-
preting the PSLRA even though it has much relevance in
showing Congress' true intent for the pleading standard. 19
If a court focuses only on the statutory text and ignores
the abundant legislative history, it may conclude that fol-
lowing the Second Circuit's test comports with the require-
ments of the PSLRA.320 However, a strong argument exists
that from the legislative history, Congress intended a stricter
standard than that of the Second Circuit. 21 Because reck-
lessness has generally been acceptable for pleading scienter,
Congress probably intended to keep this prong of the Second
Circuit's test.322 However, "motive and opportunity" has been
more controversial, and therefore, is insufficient under the
PSLRA.323
V. PROPOSAL
Whether or not the use of legislative history is appropri-
ate when interpreting statutory text, it is clear that the Su-
preme Court has been leaning toward a plain meaning ap-
proach for some time.3" Thus, when the issue of pleading
(1994).
315. See Lori L. Outzs, A Principled Use of Congressional Floor Speeches in
Statutory Interpretation, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 297, 298 (1995).
316. 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
317. Coffee, supra note 46, at 981 (quoting Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579).
318. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 976.
319. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
320. See Olson, supra note 11, at 1120.
321. See supra Part IV.B.1.
322. See supra Part IV.A. This is also supported by the new "history" of the
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which makes numerous references to the im-
portance of preserving the "recklessness" standard. See S. REP. No. 105-182
(1998); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803 (1998).
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scienter under the PSLRA reaches the appellate courts, and
possibly the Supreme Court, plain meaning will carry more
weight than legislative history.3 25 Though this approach
could lead to a result that contradicts the true intent of Con-
gress,326 plain meaning and legislative history could be recon-
ciled if a court follows the Baesa reasoning. 27
In Baesa, the court held that the PSLRA does not
heighten the scienter requirement by requiring more than
"recklessness," but the PSLRA does make the pleading of
"motive and opportunity" insufficient to raise a "strong infer-
ence" of scienter.128  Baesa derived this holding from the
plain text of the statute rather than its legislative history.32 9
This result not only complies with the Supreme Court's de-
sire to use plain language in statutory interpretation, but it
also achieves Congress' intent to heighten the pleading stan-
dard by making the Second Circuit's "motive and opportu-
nity" prong insufficient.
Therefore, Congress' intent to heighten the pleading
standard can be achieved with only a plain meaning analysis
of the statute. The "recklessness" prong, which has been
commonly accepted,"' can and should remain part of the
standard for pleading scienter. However, the pleading of mo-
tive and opportunity is not necessarily stringent enough in
itself, and without more, it should not withstand a motion to
dismiss under the PSLRA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit standard for pleading scienter has
long been considered the most stringent standard in the na-
tion.33' However, under the PSLRA, much confusion has
arisen as to what the present standard is for pleading scien-
325. See supra text pp. 130-3 1.
326. See supra Part IV.B.1.
327. See supra Part IV.A. See also Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Sci-
enter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1120-21
(1998).
328. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
329. See In re Glenayre Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig, 982 F. Supp. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (citing Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242).
330. See id. at 239.
331. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
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ter,"' and courts in various circuits have come to different
conclusions as to the present standard.333 Some continue to
adopt the Second Circuit standard, 34 while others impose a
stricter standard of "conscious behavior."35 As the Zeid336
court noted in its discussion of the conflicting interpretations
of Marksman3 . and Silicon Graphics 1,338 "[t]he fact that
these two courts, in well-reasoned opinions, provide different
assessments of Congress' intent illustrates the inherent am-
biguity of the legislative record." '39
Because of this ambiguity, the issue of pleading scienter
after the PSLRA will surely continue unless Congress makes
its standard more explicit in the body of actual legislation.
Whether the courts accept only a plain meaning analysis of
the PSLRA or look to its legislative history, it is already quite
clear that Congress intended something stricter than the
standard already imposed by the Second Circuit.34 ° However,
no one knows how much more stringent Congress intended
the standard to become, and the result in a particular case
may depend upon whether a court uses a plain meaning ap-
proach or considers the legislative history as well.34'
The Baesa decision is probably our best solution to this
ambiguous congressional act because its decision survives ei-
ther approach. Baesa keeps a standard that has long been
recognized as sufficient and discards another standard that is
more controversial.342 Though there is much anticipation re-
garding the forthcoming Ninth Circuit opinion," ' which will
be the first appellate decision on this issue, it will be but one
of many appellate decisions to inevitably decide this issue.
Whatever the Ninth Circuit's outcome, the controversy sur-
rounding the standard for pleading scienter will continue un-
til either Congress clarifies its intent in actual legislation or
the Supreme Court resolves the issue. Furthermore, the new
332. See supra Part IID.
333. See supra Part II.D.
334. See supra Part II.D.1.
335. See supra Part II.D.2.
336. 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
337. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
338. No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
339. Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 912.
340. See supra Part IV.B.1.
341. See supra text pp. 104-5.
342. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
343. See supra note 146.
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statements associated with the Uniform Standards Act of
1998 regarding the scienter standard will continue to create
even more debate. Though the final resolution of this issue is
unclear, Baesa and its followers should be very influential.
Laura R. Smith
